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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3553 
 ___________ 
 
 TONY L. HAYNES, 




T. MOORE, WARDEN;  
MR. CROWLEY, DENTIST; 
MR. WILY, DENTIST 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-04958) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 16, 2010 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES AND NYGAARD Circuit Judges 
 







 In September 2009, Tony L. Haynes, previously a prisoner of the Bucks County 
Department of Corrections, filed suit pro se and in forma pauperis against T. Moore, the 
prison warden of the Bucks County Correctional Facility, and two dentists at the 
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institution, whose names he gave as Mr. Crowley and Mr. Wily.  Proceeding under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, he claimed that the dentists improperly extracted his wisdom tooth, 
causing a permanent hole in his gum and severe irritation and pain.  Haynes also alleged 
that the dentists were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment when they ignored his ten subsequent requests for follow-up care 
and denied him further treatment to fix the injury between February 2009 and September 
2009.   The basis for the claim against Moore was his perceived failure to investigate the 
grievance Haynes filed in January 2009, in which he complained that he had developed a 
severe irritation after the extraction of his wisdom tooth and that he continued to have 
difficulties with the gum area despite visiting the dentist five times since then.   
 The United States Marshal’s Service tried to effect service on the dental 
defendants, but reported that no one in the “medical dept.” knew of dentists by those 
names.  Also, an Internet search conducted by the Marshal’s Service did not reveal 
dentists with those names (or with spelling variants of those names) licensed in 
Pennsylvania.  Moore, who did receive a copy of the complaint, responded by moving to 
dismiss it.  The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint as to 
Moore.  In the memorandum accompanying the order dismissing the complaint against 
Moore, the District Court also stated that the Eighth Amendment claim “appear[ed] 
deficient” as to the dental defendants.  The District Court noted that Haynes wrote, in the 
January 2009 grievance attached to the complaint, that he had been to the dentist five 
times since his wisdom tooth had been extracted.    
 Haynes subsequently submitted another form complaint.  On the form, Haynes 
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listed Moore, a dentist with the name of Crielly, and a John Doe dentist as defendants.  
On the form, he outlined the problems he had with the tooth extraction and aftermath 
(including what he described as a “hole” in another tooth) and explained that he had 
learned the proper name of one of the dental defendants.  He stated that it was Crielly 
who put the hole in his gum and Crielly he wished to sue.  Haynes explained that he 
submitted a grievance about the matter, citing the January 2009 grievance attached to his 
initial complaint.  In his complaint, he also stated that it was dentists at the State 
Correctional Institute at Somerset (SCI-Somerset), where he currently resides, who had to 
fix his dental problem.   
 Moore again filed a motion to dismiss, noting that Haynes did not assert any new 
claims against him in the amended complaint, and incorporating by reference his 
previous arguments for dismissal as to him.  The District Court, noting that Haynes had 
not filed a motion to amend the complaint, treated the amended complaint as a motion to 
amend the complaint and denied it.  The District Court noted that Haynes wished to add 
two defendants who treated him at Bucks County Prison, but concluded that the 
amendment would be futile because Haynes’s claims against the defendants amounted to 
claims of negligence or professional malpractice that were insufficient to state a 
constitutional violation.  The District Court dismissed Haynes’s action.   
 Haynes appeals.  He has filed a motion to dismiss Moore from the appeal.  In his 
motion, he explains that his “case was for the dentist at Buck[s] County Jail name[d] 
Dr[.] Crillcey.”  Repeating the name as Dr. Crillcey, Haynes also states that another 
dentist, a woman, helped Dr. Crillcey when he put a hole in Haynes’s gum.  He notes that 
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he went back to Dr. Crillcey approximately four times and that Dr. Crillcey hurt him and 
put a hole in his gum and a hole in his tooth before the Bucks County jail sent him to 
another dentist for an X-ray.  He explains that it was dentists at SCI-Somerset who 
provided relief from his dental problem.           
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We grant Haynes’s motion to 
dismiss Moore from this appeal, and construe Haynes’s arguments to mean that he 
appeals only from the order in which the District Court construed his amended complaint 
as a motion to amend, denied it on the basis that amendment was futile, and dismissed the 
action.  We review an order denying leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  See Grayson 
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  To the extent that the District 
Court dismissed the claims against the defendants who had not been served pursuant to 
its obligation to screen complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, our review of the dismissal 
is plenary.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 As Haynes has admitted that he provided the wrong names for the defendants, the 
District Court committed no error in dismissing the claims as to Crowley and Wily.  
However, the District Court should have permitted Haynes to amend his complaint to 
correct the name of one of the dentists who was initially misidentified.  Rule 15 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend should “be freely given 
when justice so requires.”  However, a district court may exercise its discretion and deny 
leave to amend on the basis of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, or 
futility.  See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 
1997) (citations omitted)  
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 The District Court cited futility as its reason for disallowing amendment, on the 
basis that claims against the dental defendants amounted to claims of negligence or 
professional malpractice that were insufficient to state a constitutional violation.  The bar 
to plead an Eighth Amendment is high – “[o]nly ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain’ or ‘deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs’ of prisoners [is] sufficiently 
egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 
218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).  Neither allegations of medical malpractice nor a disagreement 
about a course of treatment establishes a constitutional violation.  See id.  However, 
violations include the intentional infliction of pain on a prisoner; the denial of reasonable 
requests for medical treatment where the denial exposes the prisoner to undue suffering 
or the threat of tangible residual injury; and the intentional refusal to provide care in 
cases where the need for medical care is known.  See id.  The medical condition must be 
serious; and the prison officials must be deliberately indifferent to it.  See id. at 236.   
 In this case, it is possible, based on the allegations, that Haynes had a serious 
medical need.  He described a hole in his gum and a hole in his tooth after a tooth 
extraction that caused pain that interfered with eating and drinking, and a continuous 
toothache and severe gum irritation for several months.  According to him, the problem 
was not fixed until he was transferred to SCI-Somerset and dentists there extracted the 
tooth that had been damaged in the extraction and prescribed a course of antibiotics.  It is 
also possible, taking all inferences in favor of Haynes at this stage, that the Bucks County 
dentist was deliberately indifferent to Haynes’s medical need.  As the District Court 
noted, before January 2009, Haynes had seen the dentist five times (as Haynes stated in 
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the grievance attached to his complaint).  However, Haynes alleged that he could not get 
care for the continuing problem after January 2009.  He stated that his ten requests for 
needed medical care from February 2009 through September 2009 were denied with 
deliberate indifference.    
 It is possible that Haynes will not succeed on his claim in the end.  Although his 
allegations state a claim, his complaint may ultimately prove to be one of disagreement 
with a course of treatment, for which he would not be able to recover.  Also, Haynes may 
not have exhausted his administrative remedies.  He alleged that he did, attaching one 
grievance in which he describes an issue relating to his claims and alluding to other staff 
requests.  In any event, the burden would be on the defendant(s) to plead failure to 
exhaust, and, if the affirmative defense were pleaded, the District Court would have to 
determine the sufficiency of the exhaustion against the policy of the Bucks County 
Correctional Facility (information about which is not currently before us).  See Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217-19 (2007).   
 At this stage, however, the District Court should have permitted Haynes leave to 
amend because amendment does not appear to be futile (and no other factors counseling 
against amendment are present).  Accordingly, we will vacate the challenged order and 
remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  See L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6.  On remand, a new summons should issue, with service of the summons and 
the complaint and its amendment to be made upon the defendant Crielly or Crillcey on 
the same terms as set forth in the District Court’s order of December 9, 2009.  As noted 
above, we grant Haynes’s motion to dismiss Moore from this appeal, and consider 
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waived any challenge to the order dismissing Moore from the suit.   
